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Abstract
We consider a production function model that transforms worker inputs into outputs
through peer effect networks. The distinguishing features of this production model are that the
network is formal and observable through worker scheduling, and selection into the network is
done by a manager. We discuss identification and suggest a variety of estimation techniques. In 
particular, we tackle endogeneity issues arising from selection into groups and exposure to
common group factors by employing a polychotomous Heckman-type selection correction. We
illustrate our method using data from the Syracuse University Men’s Basketball team, where at
any point in time the coach selects a lineup and the players interact strategically to win games.
JEL No. C31, C44, D24
Keywords: Stochastic Frontier Model, Spatial Autoregressive Model, Peer Effects, Endogenous
Network Formation, Selectivity
William Horrace-Corresponding author. The Center for Policy Research and Department of
Economics, 110 Eggers Hall, Syracuse University, Syracuse, NY, 13244/Voice: 315-443-9061/ 
Fax: 315-4431081: Email: whorrace@maxwell.syr.edu.
Xiaodong Liu -University of Colorado Boulder, USA. E-mail: xiaodong.liu@colorado.edu.
Eleonora Patacchini- The Center for Policy Research and Department of Economics at Syracuse 
University, 426 Eggers Hall, Syracuse, NY. Email: epatacch@maxwell.syr.edu. 
1 Introduction 
Endogeneity in production function estimation is not a new issue. Endogeneity of inputs can arise 
for a variety of reasons: input measurement error, simultaneity of unobservables and inputs, and 
endogeneity of "explanatory" outputs in multiple-output distance function analysis (to name a few). 
In service industries, these problems are exacerbated in obvious ways. However, one could imagine 
that the main challenge in estimating a service production function is the specication of the function 
itself. In particular, the way that labor is transformed into output may be unclear. Production 
in a service industry is typically not "serial" as it might be on a manufacturing assembly line, 
where productivity of worker A may only a¤ect the productivity of worker B, who (in turn) only 
a¤ects worker C.1 Service industries may be characterized by teams of workers whose individual 
productivities are interrelated in complex ways and (in particular) through networks. Consider an 
architectural rm which simultaneously produces design plans for a variety of projects with teams 
of architects and draftsmen, who may work across multiple projects in a given workday. In this 
setting worker interrelatedness may be determined by networks established by a single manager, who 
assigns workers to teams based on both observable and unobservable characteristics of workers. This 
implies formal and measurable time-varying networks which may be endogenous due to selectivity.2 
Understanding network e¤ects in production may be important for worker scheduling and design of 
worker incentive schemes. 
The purpose of this paper is to specify an econometric model that incorporates peer e¤ects on 
worker productivity (output).3 That is, a workers productivity is a function of the productivities 
of the co-workers on her team, where teams are assigned by managers. Individual team members 
interact through time-varying interaction schemes which serve as proxies for the managerial decision 
and which function as the mechanism for group formation and individual interrelatedness. In most 
econometric network models, selection into groups is as much an individual choice as is the behavior 
that stems from a given network structure.4 In this setting endogeneity problems may arise if the 
1This is not to suggest that a manufacturing process could not be more complicated, but the traditional assembly 
line process possesses this feature. 
2 There may also be informal networks, but they are not the focus here. Informal networks may arise through 
a principle-agent problem of imperfect montioring. A manager may order a worker to split her time evenly on the 
two projects, but she may not, in practice. An alternative way to conceptualize this phenomenon is that the formal 
network is measured with error. 
3 Peer e¤ects have been indicated as one of the main empirical determinants of several important social phenomena 
(see Jackson and Zenou, 2013, part III, for a collection of recent studies ). 
4 Some studies exploit random assignement. For example, in lab experiments or (infrequently) in eld experiments 
a scientist or social planner determines groupings (see, e.g., Falk and Ichino, 2006, or Guryan et al., 2009). 
2 
model does not account for unobserved individual characteristics driving both network formation and 
behavior over networks. We consider the unique situation where a manager selects workers into teams 
(networks) to produce output, and we call this model a Network Production Function Model. In the 
model, network connections are captured by a binary adjacency matrix, where adjacency is specied 
as a binary indicator of team membership. The salient feature of this model is that team membership 
is perfectly observable.5 ;6 In this model, the managers selection decisions depend on the combination 
of individual characteristics at the team level, rather than individual-level characteristics. Such 
team-level factors contribute to the so called "correlated e¤ects" (Manski, 1993), which could be 
confounded with peer e¤ects and lead to identication problems. 
We use a polychotomous Heckman-type correction to address this problem in the context of 
production networks. In team projects, the probability of selecting a worker for the project is not 
independent across workers. We exploit this interdependency for the identication and estimation 
of peer e¤ects in network production functions. This is the main contribution of the paper. 
More specically, we consider productivity of a single project, involving a two-stage process. 
First, the manager chooses a team (lineup) of m workers (m is predetermined) from a population 
of n workers to work on the project of interest. Residual workers are assigned to other projects.7 
Next, workers work on the project to produce output for a given time period. For the population of 
n workers, the n n adjacency matrix across all projects is potentially endogenous. By focusing on 
a single project of interest, we have an mm submatrix of the adjacency matrix which is exogenous 
conditional on selection into the specic project. Thus, the network endogeneity is reduced to a 
selectivity bias, which can be corrected using a xed e¤ect estimator or a polychotomous Heckman-
type bias correction procedure due to Lee (1983) and Dahl (2002).8 
The resulting selectivity bias term is an inverse mills ratio (in the case of the Lees parametric 
estimate) or a single index (in the case of the Dahls semi-parametric estimate), varies across lineups 
and time, and can be interpreted in two interesting ways. First, it can be thought of as a xed e¤ect 
5 Manski (1993) suggests that it is not possible to identify network e¤ects if researchers do not know how networks 
or reference groups are formed by individulas in the network. 
6 It is also possible for adjacency to be measured as cumulative time that individuals worked together on a project. 
This would be directly measurable from time-cards, but we do not explore it here. 
7 We note that, in any period the n -m residual workers are assigned to other projects, and lags of the output 
from these projects (as well as the project of interest) are treated as explanatory variables in the output and selection 
equations. In this sense our specication is not unlike the multiple-output distance function (Fare and Primont, 1990) 
where a single output is modeled as functions of the remaining outputs. 
8 It is also interesting to note that the word "lineup" evokes an image of workers standing in a line. Our notion 
of lineup allows us to abstract from the complicated endogenous network for all the workers to a simple, xed and 
complete network of workers in a project. 
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that purges and quanties the correlated e¤ects of Manski (1993). That is, Manski noted that there 
may be unobserved e¤ects, "wherein individuals in the same group tend to behave similarly because 
they have similar individual characteristics or face similar institutional environments."9 In this case 
the group is the observed lineup, and the "institutional environment" is the managers selection 
of the lineup into the project of interest. In this sense we use Heckman (1979) to solve Manskis 
correlated e¤ects problem. In fact, in terms of estimation, we employ a xed e¤ect estimator in 
the style of Lee (2007) that di¤erences out the correlated e¤ect. Second, the selection bias term 
is loosely interpretable as managerial competence or e¢ ciency. That is, all things being equal and 
averaging out luck, it is the managers lineup selection that produces any unobserved team e¤ect 
and, hence, variability of worker output. This is similar to the notion of ine¢ ciency in the stochastic 
frontier literature (Aigner et al., 1977; and Meeusen and van den Broeck, 1977), so our selectivity 
bias term can be thought of as e¢ ciency if it increases output and as ine¢ ciency if it lowers it. Also, 
insofar as our bias term may be estimated from a rst-stage selection equation, it is interpretable as 
x-e¢ ciency in the stochastic frontier literature (Alvarez et al., 2006).10 
Our empirical example is the network production function for college basketball. While this may 
only loosely represent a service industry production process, it is su¢ cient for the purpose of illus-
tration. In this setting there are n players on a team engaged in two projects at any given period 
of time: ve players interact to produce o¤ense and defense, and n - 5 players sit on the bench 
to produce rest (which is inversely correlated with fatigue).11 Our measure of active player pro-
ductivity is e¢ ciency, which aggregates time-averaged performance statistics on points, rebounds, 
blocks, steals, misses, assists, and other measures of o¤ensive and defensive activity for each player. 
We include a measure of lagged fatigue as an explanatory variable to control for the productivity 
of benched players. Our data are all player substitutions during the regular 2011-2012 season of 
the Syracuse University mens college basketball team. We nd statistically signicant positive pro-
duction spillovers across players in the same category (guards or forwards), but insignicant e¤ects 
across players in di¤erent categories. When selectivity bias is taken into account, our estimate of 
peer e¤ects in productivity is 0.0534. That is, a one unit increase in the average e¢ ciency of the 
other active guards (forwards) induces a 0.0534 increase in the e¢ ciency of an individual guard 
9 Manski (1993) page 533. 
10 More generally, it is interpretable as another source of heterogeneity. However, it is still interesting to speculate 
on the ways it may embody (in)e¢ cienecy. 
11 We take the managerial decisions and performance of the opposing team as exogenous. In this sense our notion 
of strategic equlibrium is only partial. 
4 
(forward) once selectivity bias taken into consideration. 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. The next section reviews the related literature, while 
highlighting the contribution of our paper. Section 3 introduces the econometric specication of a 
network production model, while Section 4 considers the specication and estimation of a network 
production model with selectivity. Section 5 provides an empirical example, using data from the 
2011-12 Syracuse University Mens basketball team. Section 6 concludes. 
2 Related Literature 
Our paper lies at the intersection of di¤erent literatures. We briey review them below, while 
highlighting our contribution. 
2.1 Econometrics of network models 
A number of papers have dealt with the identication and estimation of peer e¤ects with network data 
(see Blume et al., 2011 for an excellent survey). There are three main methodological approaches. 
(i) The network is assumed exogenous. Identication relies on network topology and estimation is 
performed using 2SLS or GMM. The possible presence of unobserved factors responsible for network 
endogeneity is treated by network xed e¤ects (see, e.g., Lee, 2007; Bramoullé et al., 2009; Calvó-
Armengol et al., 2009; Lee et al., 2010; Liu and Lee, 2010). 
(ii) Self-selection of individuals into groups is explicitly taken into account. A selection equation 
based on individual decisions is added in approach (i) to treat possible network endogeneity. An 
individual-level selection correction term is then added in the outcome equation. This approach is 
considered in Liu et al. (2012). 
(iii) Parametric modeling assumptions and Bayesian inferential methods are employed to inte-
grate a network formation model with the model of behavior over the formed networks. The selection 
equation is based on individual decisions as in approach (ii). The network formation and the outcome 
equation are estimated jointly (see, e.g., Mele, 2013; Goldsmith-Pinkham and Imbens, 2013; Hsieh 
and Lee, 2013). 
In our network production function model selection is done by a social planner (manager), rather 
than being the result of individual decisions. Hence, the possible network endogeneity can be treated 
by a group-level selection correction term. We show in this paper that the group-level selection 
correction term can either be treated as a group xed e¤ect as in approach (i) or be directly estimated 
as in approach (ii). Either approach is computationally simple, and thus we do not rely on Bayesian 
5 
methods. 
2.2 Network e¤ects in productivity 
There is a limited literature on networks in production processes. Guryan et al. (2009) consider 
performance of professional golng pairs, but their parings are randomly assigned and the pairings 
are competitors not teammates. Bandiera et al. (2009) analyze the productivity of fruit pickers, 
but their networks are based on worker characteristics, and not on managerial formation of teams. 
Mas and Moretti (2009) consider peer e¤ects in the performance of supermarket cashiers, but do 
not specically employ teams or networks in their analysis. Hamilton et al. (2003) analyze the e¤ect 
of teams on clothing manufacturing, but do not exploit team composition in a network analysis 
framework. In all these studies, when production networks or pairings are employed, they are 
assumed exogenous. Here, we specify a model where endogeneity is assured but replaced with 
team-level selectivity bias, which can be corrected using a xed e¤ect estimator or a polychotomous 
Heckman-type bias correction procedure. 
2.3 Production function literature 
Our focus is a single rm where the unit of observation is the worker who is observed over time. 
This is in contrast to the spatial production function work of Druska and Horrace (2004) or Glass 
et al. (2013), where the unit of observation is the rm, and exogenous networks are conceptualized 
as output/input spillovers across rms (or countries) measured as geographic distances or contiguity 
in a spatial estimation framework, and where consistency arguments are for large numbers of rms 
(or countries). In these papers it is not easy to conceptualize the network (spillover) mechanism 
or to argue that the adjacency matrix is the correct proxy for the mechanism.12 In our case (the 
single rm) the network mechanism is clearly based on labor force peer-e¤ects (e.g., Kandel and 
Lazear, 1992), and the adjacency matrix, based on the managers assignments, would seem to be 
an excellent proxy for this mechanism.13 The downside to our approach is that employee-level 
data (administrative data) may not be available to the econometrician. However, the methods 
considered herein could be used by managers, and the data available to them on employee and 
project characteristics would be quite detailed. Fortunately for us, the econometric model is also 
12 In their defense Druska and Horraces distance and contiguity networks are a proxy for infrastructure (roads 
and bridges) on the island of Java. They nd strong output spillovers across rice farms in the dry season and weak 
spillovers in the rainy season, when travel between villages on the island may be di¢ cult. 
13 Manski (1993) argues that the spatial correlation model "makes sense in studies of small-group interactions, where 
the sample is composed of clusters of friends, co-workers, or household members... But it does not make sense in 
studies of neighborhood and other large-group e¤ects, where the sample members are randomly chosen individuals." 
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suited for estimation of peer e¤ects in sports teams, where all networks (the coachs decisions) 
are observed and where performance is directly measurable by the econometrician. Therefore, we 
illustrate our model using data from the Syracuse University Mens College Basketball team. 
3 A General Network Production Model 
Consider a rm with n workers and a manager that allocates workers to various projects (peer 
groups) in each time period t = 1; ::; T . The number and composition of projects is unimportant 
to the econometric specication, but they may have implications for identication and estimation. 
When the manager allocates workers to projects she explicitly species an n  n adjacency matrix 
which determines the interrelatedness of the workers productivity. Let the adjacency matrix be 
o odenoted by Ao = [a ], where a = 1 if workers i and j are assigned to the same project in period t ij;t ij;t 
o ot and a 0 otherwise. We set a 0. Let the row-normalized Ao be At = [aij;t], where ij;t = ii;t = t P
o n o 14 aij;t = aij;t = k=1 aik;t. Then productivity of the worker i in period t is given by 
Pn 
yit =  j=1 aij;tyjt + xit + uit: (1) 
In this model, the dependent variable yit is the productivity of worker i in period t. The term Pn 
j=1 aij;tyjt is the average productivity of worker is co-workers assigned to the same project as i in 
period t, with its coe¢ cient  capturing the peer e¤ect. xit is a 1kx vector of exogenous variables. 
uit is the regression disturbance. In matrix form, (1) can be written as 
Yt = AtYt +Xt + Ut; (2) 
0where Yt = (y1t;    ; ynt)0 , Xt = (x ;    ; x0 )0, and Ut = (u1t;    ; unt)0 .1t nt
If we assume that At is exogenous so that E(UtjAt; Xt) = 0, then model (2) can be estimated 
using spatial panel data methods (see Lee and Yu, 2010 for a survey). However, it is reasonable to 
believe that the manager may have some information about Ut and her choices of how to allocate 
workers to projects may be correlated with Ut. If this is the case, then E(UtjAt; Xt) =6 0 and At is 
endogenous. 
To nd a remedy for the problem of endogenous adjacency matrix, we focus on the workers 
allocated to a specic project. Let dit be an indicator variable such that dit = 1 if worker is assigned 
n o14 For simplicity, we assume no worker is assigned to a project alone so that 
P 
> 0 for all i.k=1 aik;t 
7 
to the project in period t and dit = 0 otherwise. Suppose mt workers are allocated to the project. 
Then, for worker i assigned to the project (i.e. dit = 1), (1) can be written as 
 yit =  
1 P
j
n 
=1;j=i djtyjt + xit + E(uitjDt) + uit; (3)6mt 
 where Dt = (d1t;    ; dnt)0 and u = uit -E(uitjDt). By construction, E(u jDt) = 0 and, thus, the it it
weights djt in the peer e¤ect regressor can be considered exogenous. We refer to E(uitjDt) as the 
selectivity bias. 
Note, as mt is often predetermined (e.g., in sports games, the number of active players mt is 
xed), dit is not independent across i. Hence, in the our econometric model, instead of modeling the 
probability of a certain worker is assigned to a project (i.e. Pr(dit = 1)), we consider the probability 
of a set of workers (a lineup) is assigned to a project. 
4 A Network Model with Selectivity 
4.1 The econometric model 
In time period t, the manager allocates a lineup of mt workers from a set of n workers to a project.15 
Suppose there are qt possible lineups, with a lineup denoted by Ls for s = 1;    ; qt. Then, the 
manager allocates lineup Ls to the project in period t if and only if d > maxr 6 d =s , where st rt
d st = st ; for s = 1;    ; qt: (4)+ st
In (4), st is the deterministic component of d and  is a scalar random innovation with zero mean st st 
and unit variance. Let dst be a dummy variable such that dst = 1 if the lineup Ls is chosen to play 
in period t and dst = 0 otherwise. Then, dst = 1 if and only if st < 0 where st = maxr d - d =s st. 
The productivity of lineup Ls in period t is given by the following model 
6 rt 
Yst = WtYst +Xst + Ust: (5) 
In (5), Yst = [yit]i2Ls is an mt  1 vector of observations on the dependent variable of the workers 
1in lineup Ls in period t. Wt is a constant weighting matrix given by Wt = (1mt 1
0 - Imt ). mt-1 mt 
WtYst measures the average productivity of a workers co-workers in lineup Ls in period t, with 
15 mt is assumed to be predetermined. 
8 
its coe¢ cient  capturing the peer e¤ect. Xst = [xit]i2Ls is an mt  kx matrix of observations 
on kx exogenous variables of the workers in lineup Ls in period t. Ust is an mt  1 vector of 
regression disturbances such that Ust  i:i:d:(0;). We allow for possible correlation between Ust 
and  = (1t;    ;  ) such that t qt;t
E(Ustjdst = 1; t) = s(t)1mt ; (6) 
where t = (1t;    ; qt;t). 
A possible specication of Ust that leads to (6) is given by 
Ust = st1mt + Vst; (7) 
where st is an i.i.d. time-varying lineup-specic error component with mean zero and variance 
2 , and Vst is an mt  1 vector of i.i.d. random innovations with mean zero and variance 2 . The  v
error component st can be interpreted as a random shock in period t that may a¤ect di¤erent 
lineups di¤erently. Suppose the manager has some information about the realization of st but no 
information about that of Vst when she chooses a lineup. Then, 
R R 0 stgst(st; stjt)
E(Ustjdst = 1; t) = E(stjst < 0; t)1mt = -1 dstdst1mt = s(t)1mt ;Pr(st < 0jt) 
16 where gst(st; stjt) is the conditional joint density of st and st. 
Let U = (t)1mt . (5) can be written as st Ust - s
Yst = +Xst (t)1mt + U
 : (8)WtYst + s st
The selectivity bias s(t) introduces a group correlated e¤ect (Manski, 1993) to the model. As 
pointed out by Dahl (2002), semi-parametric estimation of  and  along with the unknown function 
s() would face the the curse of dimensionality due to the presence of a large number of alter-
natives. To make the estimation feasible, restrictions need to be imposed on s(). In the following 
subsections, we consider three di¤erent approaches for estimation of (8). 
16 The specication given by (7) is merely an example to motivate the assumption (6). The validity of the proposed 
estimators does not rely on this specication. 
9 
4.2 The parametric selection correction approach 
Let Fst(jt) denote the conditional distribution function of st  6 d - d Let () andmaxr=s rt st. 
() denote the standard normal distribution and density respectively. Lee (1983) suggests using the 
transformation Jst()  -1(Fst(jt)) to reduce the dimensionality of the selectivity bias. In terms 
of Jst(st), the selectivity bias is given by 
E(Ustjdst = 1; t) = E[UstjJst(st) < Jst(0); t]: 
Note, by construction, Jst(st) is a standard normal random variable and its marginal distribution 
does not depend on t. However, the joint distribution of Ust and Jst(st) may still depend on t. 
As pointed out by Dahl (2002) and Bourguignon et al. (2007), the following assumption is implicitly 
imposed in Lee (1983). 
Assumption 1 The joint distribution of Ust and Jst(st) does not depend on t. 
Assumption 1 implies that E[UstjJst(st) < Jst(0); t] = E[UstjJst(st) < Jst(0)]. Furthermore, to 
obtain an explicit functional form of the selectivity bias, we make the following assumption that is 
widely used in empirical studies. 
Assumption 2 Ust and Jst(st) are i.i.d. with a joint normal distribution given by17 
323232 64 Ust 75  N(64 0 75 ; 64  121mt 75): (9) 
Jst(st) 0 121
0 1mt 
Given Assumption 2, the selectivity bias is given by 
(Jst(0))
E(Ustjdst = 1; t) = -12 1mt : (10)Fst(0jt) 
Let Pst = Pr(dst = 1jt) be the probability of choosing lineup Ls in period t given t. As E(Ustjdst = 
1; t) = s(t)1mt , Jst(0) = 
-1(Fst(0jt)) and Pst = Fst(0jt), it follows from (10) that 
(-1(Pst))
s(t) = -12 : (11) 
Pst 
17 The likelihood function of the model based on the joint normal distribution (9) is given in Appendix A. 
10 
The transformation using Jst() greatly reduces the dimensionality of the multiple index function 
s(t) because it allows s(t) to depend on t only through Pst with a single unknown parameter 
12. Substitution of (11) into (8) gives 
(-1(Pst)) 
= + U : (12)Yst WtYst +Xst - 12 1mt stPst 
For the network model, Lees approach can be implemented as follows. 
Step 1: Let st = zst, where zit is a 1  kz vector of exogenous variables. Then,  can be 
estimated by maximizing the likelihood function 
T qtP P 
lnL = dst lnPst: (13) 
t=1 s=1 
It proves convenient to assume that  is independently and identically Gumbel distributed so that st PqtPst = exp(zst)= exp(zrt) (McFadden, 1974). Then,  can be estimated by a conditional r=1 
logit estimator ̂. Pqt^Step 2: With the predicted probabilities = exp(zst̂)= exp(zrt ̂) obtained in the rst Pst r=1 
step, we consider the feasible counterpart of (12) 
^(-1(Pst)) 
+ UYst = WtYst +Xst - 12 1mt st ; (14)
P̂st 
and estimate (; 0; 12)0 by the two-stage least squares (2SLS) estimator with linearly independent 
columns in WtXst as instruments for WtYst. The correct asymptotic covariance matrix of the 2SLS 
estimator can be derived in a similar way as in Lee et al. (1980) with appropriate modications. 
4.3 The semi-parametric selection correction approach 
Dahl (2002) proposes an alternative selection correction approach based on the index su¢ ciency 
assumption that the joint distribution of Ust and st depends on t only through Pst = Pr(dst = 
1jt). Based on this idea, we impose the following assumption to reduce the dimensionality of the 
selectivity bias. 
Assumption 3 s(t) = (Pst). 
11 
Assumption 3 implies that the multiple index selectivity bias E(Ustjdst = 1; t) depends on t 
only through Pst, and, thus, equation (8) becomes 
= + U : (15) Yst WtYst +Xst + (Pst)1mt st
For the parametric approach, Assumption 2 implies that the functional form of () is given by 
(Pst) = -12(-1(Pst))=Pst. For the semi-parametric approach, we approximate (Pst) by series 
expansions (see, Andrews, 1991; Newey, 1997) without imposing functional form assumptions on 
(). 
Thus, the semi-parametric selection correction approach can be implemented in a similar two-step 
procedure as the parametric approach. 
^Step 1: We obtain the predicted probabilities Pst from, say, a conditional conditional logit 
regression. PK ^Step 2: We replace (Pst) in (15) by its (feasible) series approximation kbk(Pst), where k=1 
the functions bk() are referred to as the basis functions,18 and estimate (; 0)0 together with the 
series expansion coe¢ cients k by the 2SLS estimator with linearly independent columns in WtXst 
as instruments for WtYst.19 
4.4 The xed-e¤ect approach 
From a di¤erent perspective, the selectivity bias s(t) in (8) can be considered as a time-varying 
lineup-specic xed e¤ect. To avoid estimating the unknown function s(), we can apply a within 
transformation to eliminate this term from (8). 
Suppose Xst = [X1;st; 1mt x2;st], where X1;st is an mtk1 matrix of observations on k1 individual-
varying exogenous variables and x2;st is a 1  k2 vector of individual-invariant exogenous variables 
(k1 + k2 = kx). Then, equation (8) can be written as 
= (t)1mt + U
 : (16) Yst WtYst +X1;st1 + 1mt x2;st2 + s st
Let Qt = - 1 10 denote the within-transformation projector. Then, as Qt1mt = 0 andImt 1mt mtmt 
18 Dahl (2002) nd similar results in his application using either polynomial or Fourier series as basis functions. 
19 For consistency and asymptotic normality, the number of basis functions should increase with the sample size 
(see, Andrews, 1991; Newey, 1997). In practice, the number of basis functions is chosen by the researcher. 
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QtU
 = QtUst, pre-multiplication of (8) by Qt gives st 
QtYst = QtWtYst +QtX1;st1 +QtUst: (17) 
Then,  and 1 can be estimated from the within model (17) by the conditional maximum likelihood 
(CML) approach in Lee (2007).20 
The xed-e¤ect approach does not impose any restrictions on s(t). However, given the special 
structure of the weighting matrix Wt, the workers in the chosen lineup form a complete network. 
The within transformation may cause an identication problem similar to the one studied in Lee 
(2007). This can be seen from the reduced form equation of (17). Suppose jj < 1, then it follows 
from (5) that 
Yst = (Imt - Wt)-1X1;st1 + (Imt - Wt)-1Ust: (18) 
1 10 mt-1For Wt = (1mt -Imt ), we have Qt(Imt -Wt)-1 = Qt. Therefore, pre-multiplication mt-1 mt mt-1+
of (18) by Qt gives 
mt - 1 mt - 1 
QtYst = QtX1;st1 + QtUst: (19) mt - 1 +  mt - 1 + 
From (19), we can see that the within model (17) can be identied if mt varies over t. On the other 
hand, if mt = m for all t, then the peer e¤ect coe¢ cient  cannot be identied from 1 after the 
within transformation. 
To identify the peer e¤ect when mt = m for all t, we need to introduce some exclusion restrictions. 
o oOne possibility is to introduce heterogenous peer e¤ects. Let W = [w ] be an adjacency matrix 1s ij;1s
o owith w = 1 if the ith and jth workers in the lineup s are of the same type and w = 0 otherwise.ij;1s ij;1s 
o o oLet W = [w ] be an adjacency matrix with w = 1 if the ith and jth workers in the lineup s2s ij;2s ij;2s 
o 1 o 1are of di¤erent types and w = 0. By construction, (W o +W ) = W  (1m10 - Im).ij;2s m-1 1s 2s m-1 m 
Let W1s and W2s be row-normalized W o and W o respectively, such that W1s1m =W2s1m = 1m.21 1s 2s PT20 The CML estimator is consistent and asymptotically normal as in Lee (2007) as the sample size t=1 mt goes 
to innity. 
21 Sometimes, W 0 (or W 0 ) may have a row of zeros. For example, if worker i has no co-worker of the same type in a s1 s2
olineup, then w = 0 for all j. Then, the corresponding row of Ws1 (or Ws2) is also zero. As a result, Ws11mt 6=ij;1s 1mt 
(or Ws21mt 6 1mt ), and the likelihood function cannot be derived for the transformed dependent variable QtYst (see =
Liu and Lee, 2010). In this case, the model after within transformation given by (21) can be estimated by the GMM 
approach in Liu and Lee (2010). 
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Then, (16) can be generalized to a model with heterogenous peer e¤ects given by 
= (t)1mt + U
 ; (20)Yst 1W1sYst + 2W2sYst +X1;st1 + 1mt x2;st2 + s st
where 1 captures the same-type peer e¤ect and 2 captures the cross-type peer e¤ect. Pre-
1multiplying (20) by Q = Im - 1m10 , we have mm 
QYst = 1QW1sYst + 2QW2sYst +QX1;st1 +QUst: (21) 
As (Im-1W1s-2W2s)-1 = 1W1s(Im-1W1s-2W2s)-1 +2W2s(Im-1W1s-2W2s)-1 +Im, 
it follows from the reduced form equation of (20) that 
)-1UQYst = Q(Im - 1W1s - 2W2s)-1X1;st1 +Q(Im1 - 1W1s - 2W2s st (22) 
= 1QW1s(Im - 1W1s - 2W2s)-1X1;st1 + 2QW2s(Im - 1W1s - 2W2s)-1X1;st1 
)-1U+QX1;st1 +Q(Im1 - 1W1s - 2W2s st 
= 1E(QW1sYstjXst; dst) + 2E(QW2sYstjXst; dst) +QX1;st1 
)-1U+Q(Im1 - 1W1s - 2W2s st: 
Therefore, (1; 2; 
0 
1) can be separately identied if E(QW1sYstjXst; dst), E(QW2sYstjXst; dst), and 
columns in QX1;st are linearly independent for some t. 
To better understand this identication condition, we consider a special case that 1 = 2 = 0 
in the data generating process. In this case, it follows from the reduced form equation of (20) that 
E(QW1sYstjXst; dst) = QW1sX1;st1 and E(QW2sYstjXst; dst) = QW2sX1;st1. Thus, a necessary 
condition for E(QW1sYstjXst; dst), E(QW2sYstjXst; dst), and QX1;st to be linearly independent is 
that QW1s, QW2s and Q are linearly independent. Although QW 0 +QW2
0 
s = (m- 1)QW = -Q,1s 
for the row normalized adjacency matrices W1s and W2s, QW1s, QW2s and Q can still be linearly 
independent in general. Therefore, model (21) can be identied. The CML estimator in Lee et al. 
(2010) can be easily generalized to estimate (21). 
To summarize, for model (16), the xed-e¤ect approach can be implemented by the following 
steps. 
Step 1: We estimate the within equation (17) by the CML estimator in Lee (2007). 
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^Step 2: We obtain the predicted probabilities Pst from, say, a conditional logit regression. 
1 10 ^Step 3: Let r̂st = m(Yst- ^ -X1;st  1WtYst 1), where ^ and ^ are the rst-step estimates. We m 
consider the regression 
^r̂st = x2;st2 + (Pst) + st; (23) 
^ ^ ^where the selectivity bias (Pst) is either given by -12(-1(Pst))=Pst in the parametric approach PK ^or approximated by kbk(Pst) in the semi-parametric approach, and  is the error term. We k=1 st 
^estimate 2 together with the unknown parameters in (Pst) by the OLS estimator. 
4.5 Comparison of the estimation approaches 
Like other Heckman-type two-step selection bias correction procedures, the two approaches proposed 
in Sections 4.2 and 4.3 have the advantage of computational simplicity. However, both approaches 
impose strong restrictions on the selectivity bias s(t) to reduce its dimensionality.22 Furthermore, 
because of the endogeneity of the peer e¤ect regressor, the model needs to estimated by the 2SLS 
estimator that relies on the existence of valid and relevant instruments. This may be quite challenging 
in empirical applications. In our empirical example, for instance, the valid instruments are quite 
weak, although we experimented with several sets of instruments. Therefore, the 2SLS estimates 
may not be reliable. 
On the other hand, the xed e¤ect approach proposed in Section 4.4 does not impose any 
restrictions on the selectivity bias s(t). After we eliminate the selectivity bias using the within 
transformation, we can use the CML or GMM estimator to estimate the peer e¤ect. The CML and 
GMM exploit both linear and quadratic moment conditions, and, thus, may outperform the 2SLS 
estimator that only uses linear moment conditions, when the linear moment conditions are weak (see, 
Lee et al., 2010; Liu and Lee, 2010). However, as shown in Section 4.4, the within transformation 
makes the identication of the peer e¤ect more challenging because the workers in the chosen lineup 
form a complete network. In particular, we show that the within equation is not identied if mt 
does not vary over time. In this case identication can be achieved by imposing exclusion restrictions 
through heterogenous peer e¤ects. 
22 See Assumptions 1 and 2 for the parametric approach and Assumption 3 for the semi-parametric approach. 
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5 An Empirical Illustration 
As an empirical illustration, we estimate a network production function for a basketball team, where 
a coach selects lineups of players over the course of a game. As the valid instruments turn out to be 
quite weak in the empirical example, with the rst stage F statistic lower than 5 (J. and Yogo, 2005), 
estimators that leverages 2SLS may not be reliable for this data. Hence, we use the xed e¤ect 
estimation approach. As the number of active players is constant over time (i.e., mt = m), we split 
players into two types, guards and forwards, to identify the peer e¤ects. We detail the application 
of the xed e¤ect estimator for the specication considered in the empirical example in Appendix 
B. 
5.1 Data 
Our data are for the Syracuse University Mens Basketball team over the 2011-2012 season. The 
team played 33 games during the regular season (we exclude March Madness games). We dene 
a time period as the time interval between two consecutive substitutions.23 We removed overtime 
periods from the data, since the managers allocation strategy may be di¤erent in overtime. We 
removed time periods of less than 30 seconds, since there might not be enough observations on 
playersproductivities in those extremely short periods. We thus observe 79 di¤erent lineups (of 5 
active players) over 448 time periods, in total 2,240 observations.24 
There are two outputs in a basketball game: the production of o¤ense/defense (some measure 
related to the "on court" productivity of active players) and rest (players sitting on the bench).25 
We take the opposing teams strategy as exogenous, using only a measure of the teams Rating 
Percentage Index (RPI) from the previous year which we describe below. 
5.2 Variable denition 
The dependent variable Yst of equation (20) is measured using using the e¢ ciency statistic EFFit: 
EFFit = (PTit +REBit +ASTit + STLit +BLKit -MFGit -MFTit - TOit)=Minsit 
23 Our time periods have irregular length. 
24 An important problem, which is common to most existing empirical studies, is a possible misspecication of the 
network structure. The main threats are sampling issues due to the fact that only a subset of connections are observed 
(see, e.g., Chandrasekhar and Lewis, 2011; Lin, 2013; Liu et al., 2013). In our case, the coach selects lineups to produce 
output, so that networks are accurately measured. 
25 It could be argued that there a multiple o¤ensive outputs (points, rebounds, assists, etc.) and multiple defensive 
outputs (steals, blocks, rebounds, etc.). However our purpose is to illustrate the econometric contribution, and not 
to perform a comprehensive empirical analysis. 
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where PTit is points, REBit is rebounds, ASTit is assists, STLit is steals, BLKit is blocks, MFGit 
is missed eld goals, MFTit is missed free throws, TOit is turn overs, and Minsit is minutes played 
for player i in period t.26 These are period-by-period statistics and not season-long aggregates. 
Over the course of the entire season and across players the average e¢ ciency is 0.37 with a standard 
deviation of 1.07, a minimum of -3.75, and a maximum of 8.28. This is not calculated when a player 
is on the bench. 
The individual-varying exogenous variables in the main equation (the X1;st s) are Experienceit 
and Fatigueit. Experienceit is minutes played from the start of the game to the end of period t-1. 
It has and average of 9.91 minutes, a standard deviation of 7.81, a minimum of 0, and a maximum 
of 37.58 minutes. For active player i in period t- 1, Fatigueit is minutes continuously played until 
the end of period t- 1; for inactive players in period t- 1, fatigue is 0. The average fatigue across 
the entire season is 3.78 minutes with a standard deviation of 5.09 minutes. The high variance is 
due to the fact that there are players who almost always continuously play and those who almost 
never play. 
The exogenous variables that do not vary over i in the main equation (the x2;st s) are the opposing 
teams Rating Percentage Index (RPIt), Homet, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the game is played 
in the Syracuse University Carrier Done (two-thirds of the games were played at home in the 2011-
2012 season), and 2nd-Halft, a dummy variable equal to 1 if the current period is in the second 
half of the game. The rating percentage index is one of the systems used to rank NCAA teams and 
is based on a teams wins, losses and its strength of schedule. This system has been in use in college 
basketball since 1981 to aid in the selecting and seeding of teams appearing in the 68-team mens 
tournament (March Madness). The index is based on a teams winning percentage, its opponents 
winning percentage, and the winning percentage of those opponentsopponents. For the teams in 
our data the average RPI from the 2010-11 season is 0.55 with a standard deviation of 0.08. 
The exogenous variables in the selection equation are lineup-level aggregations of variables from 
the main equation. Lineup-efficiencyst is the total e¢ ciency score of the lineup s from the start 
of the game until the end of period t - 1. It has an average of 1.63 and a standard deviation of 
1.22. Lineup-experiencest is the total minutes played by the lineup at the end of period t - 1. It 
has an average of 49.57 minutes and a standard deviation of 34.03 minutes. Lineup-fatiguest is 
26 This assumes equal weights for each individual productive activities. Other weighting schemes could be considered, 
but a similar e¢ ciency measure is employed by the National Basketball Association to rank player productivity, so 
we use it as a matter of convenience. 
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the total minutes continuously played by the lineup at the end of period t- 1. It has an average of 
18.92 minutes and a standard deviation of 14.06 minutes. Lineup-foulsst is the total fouls by the 
lineup at the end of period t - 1. It has an average of 3.13 fouls and a standard deviation of 2.77 
fouls. One-substitutiont is a dummy variable equal to 1, if one player was substituted to achieve 
the lineup at time t. It has an average of 0.68 and a standard deviation of 0.46. Two-substitutiont 
is a dummy variable equal to 1, if two players were substituted to achieve the lineup at time t. It 
has an average of 0.22 and a standard deviation of 0.42. The omitted category is three or more 
players were substituted. Variable denitions and descriptive statistics are summarized in Appendix 
C (Table C.1). 
5.3 Estimation results 
5.3.1 Results without selectivity bias correction 
Let us start by presenting the ML estimation results without accounting for selectivity bias (Lee, 
2004). As the number of time periods (T = 448) is much larger than the number of players in 
the Syracuse University Mens Basketball team (n = 19), we can use player dummies to control for 
unobserved player-specic characteristics. Results are contained in Table 1. 
[insert Table 1 here] 
Model 1 considers the benchmark outcome equation (5) with homogenous peer e¤ects.27 The 
estimation results are reported in column 1 of Table 1. In line with expectations, it appears that 
players experience is positively correlated with his productivity (0:0154 e¢ ciency units per minute 
played), and the e¤ect of fatigue is negative (-0:0083 e¢ ciency units per minute continuously 
played), although it is not statistically signicant. The quality of the opposing team plays a strong 
role in decreasing players productivity (statistically signicant -1:1677), and the second-half of a 
game seems to be less productive that the rst half (signicant -0:2159). Peer e¤ects in productivity 
appear positive and statistically signicant. In terms of magnitude, an unit increase in the average 
e¢ ciency of the teammates induces a 0:0841 increase in the e¢ ciency of the individual player. 
Model 2 of Table 1 considers heterogenous peer e¤ects. We split players into two types, guards 
and forwards (no di¤erentiation of centers from forwards), and distinguish between peer e¤ects 
arising from "same-type" teammates and peer e¤ects arising from "cross-type" teammates. The 
estimation results are reported in column 2 of Table 1. It appears that the peer e¤ects are mostly 
27 We assume normality of the error distribution so that Ust  i:i:d:N(0; 2Im): 
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due to interactions between players of the same type. The same-type peer e¤ect is 0:0638 (signicant) 
and the cross-type peer e¤ect is 0:0345 (insignicant). It appears that once we condition on observed 
and unobserved player characteristics, there are no endogenous e¤ects at work between players of 
di¤erent types. 
Model 3 of Table 1 is the restricted heterogenous peer e¤ects where we only consider the same-
type peer e¤ect. The estimation results reported in column 3 of Table 1 remain roughly unchanged 
from Model 2. 
5.3.2 Results with selectivity bias correction 
As explained in Section 4.4 and detailed in Appendix B, the xed-e¤ect approach can be implemented 
in three steps. First, we use a within transformation to eliminate selectivity bias and estimate the 
transformed outcome equation by the CML approach (detailed in Section B.2). Covariates that do 
not vary at the individual level (RPI, Home and 2nd-Half) are eliminated by the within group 
transformation. As the number of active players is constant over time (i.e. mt = m), the transformed 
outcome equation is not identied for Model 1. Hence, we have to exploit heterogenous peer e¤ects 
to achieve identication. The xed-e¤ect CML estimation results are reported in Table 2. 
[insert Table 2 here] 
With both same-type and cross-type peer e¤ects in Model 2, the peer e¤ects are not signicant 
due to multicollinearity of those two e¤ects in our data. When we only consider the same-type peer 
e¤ect in Model 3, the peer e¤ect is positive and statistically signicant, but lower in magnitude than 
the corresponding estimate in Table 1 without selectivity bias correction. In line with the estimates 
in Table 1, a players experience is positively associated with her performance. The e¤ect of fatigue 
is negative and becomes statistically signicant once selectivity bias is corrected. Furthermore, the 
likelihood ratio test (test statistic is 0:96) fails to reject the restriction that cross-type peer e¤ect is 
zero at conventional signicance levels. 
[insert Table 3 here] 
Table 3 reports the second step conditional logit estimation of the selection equation.28 The 
estimates reveal the factors that are important when the coach selects the lineup. In particular, the 
28 To reduce the total number of alternatives, we restrict the set of possible lineups to the lineups that actually 
employed by the coach in a game. 
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past productivity, fatigue and number of fouls of the players in a lineup play important roles in the 
coachs lineup choices. 
[insert Table 4 here] 
Table 4 reports the third step, where the e¤ects of the individual-invariant regressors are recovered 
and the selectivity bias is estimated. The estimation procedure is detailed in Section B.3. For the 
parametric approach, the joint normality assumption (9) implies the selectivity bias has a specic 
functional form (11) with a single unknown parameter 12. For the semiparametric approach, the 
selectivity bias is approximated by a series expansion. For the parametric approach, the estimate of 
12 is insignicant. When parametric restrictions are removed, the Wald test suggests the coe¢ cients 
of the series expansion are jointly signicant and hence selection does play a role in the outcome 
equation. The estimated e¤ects of the individual-invariant regressors are in line with the estimates 
in Table 1 except the coe¢ cient of the home game dummy is now positive. 
6 Conclusion 
This paper makes contributions to both the network and production function literatures. The pro-
posed network production function mitigates traditional problems in the identication and estima-
tion of peer e¤ects, including endogenous network formation and network topology misspecication. 
In our proposed model, the network is (and peer groups are) well-dened, and selection into groups 
is not an individual choice but the decision of a manager (social planner) who has historical infor-
mation on the observable and unobservable characteristics of the workers. This allows selection into 
a single project to be at the team-level, and allows the network structure to be xed by the manager 
(predetermined for the workers), who selects teams (lineups) into the set structure. The selection 
process can be modelled in a Heckman-type framework (Heckman, 1979). Being at the team level, 
the selection correction term captures the "correlated e¤ects" of Manski (1993). Thus, our approach 
tackles in a single step the selection and the corrected e¤ects problems in the network literature. 
The solution comes at a cost of the need for administrative data on each workers history which may 
not be readily available. 
Regarding the production function literature, our analysis considers issues related to the esti-
mation of managerial e¢ ciency (the managerial selection bias correction term), the determinants of 
e¢ ciency through the selection equation, and multi-output (project) distance functions. 
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Our empirical example suggests that peer e¤ects exist among players in a basketball game and 
that a selectivity bias correction matters. 
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Appendices 
A The Likelihood Function under Joint Normality 
If Ust  N(0;), the density function of Yst is 
1 
f(Yst) = (2)
-mt =2jj-1=2jI - Wtj exp(- 
2
(Yst - WtYst -Xst)0-1(Yst - WtYst -Xst)): 
Furthermore, if Ust and Jst(st) are i.i.d. with a joint normal distribution given by (9), the conditional 
distribution of Jst(st) given Yst is 
m - WtYst 1210 ):Jst(st)jYst  N(1210 -1(Yst -Xst); 1- 2 m-11m
Then, the log-likelihood function of equations (4) and (5) is given by 
T ptP P 
lnL = dst[ln f(Jst(st)jYst) + ln f(Yst)] 
t=1 s=1 
T ptP P Jst(zst)- 1210 m-1(Yst - WtYst -Xst) = dst[ln( p ) 
t=1 s=1 1- 2 10 -11m12 m
mt 1 1 - ln 2 - ln jj+ ln jImt - Wtj - (Yst - WtYst -Xst)0-1(Yst - WtYst -Xst)]: 2 2 2
B The Empirical Model and the Fixed E¤ect Estimator 
In this appendix, we detail the xed e¤ect estimator for the specication considered in the empirical 
example. 
B.1 The empirical model 
In the empirical application, we assume the manager chooses lineup s in period t (i.e., dst = 1), if 
d > 6 d
 , where st maxr=s rt
d st = zst + st; for s = 1;    ; qt: 
We assume  is independently and identically Gumbel distributed so that Pst = Pr(dst = 1) = st P
exp(zst)= 
qt exp(zrt). r=1 
24 
The outcome equation of the chosen lineup s in period t is given by 
Yst = 1W1sYst + 2W2sYst +X1;st1 + 1mx2;st2 + Ust; (24) 
where Ust = st1m+Vst with st  N(0; 2  N(0; 2 v ). We assume, when the manager ) and Vst Im
chooses a lineup, she has no information about the realization of individual random innovations Vst 
but may has some information about the random shock st. Thus, 
E(Ustjdst = 1; t) = E(stjdst = 1; t)1m = s(t)1m; 
where t = (1t;    ; qt;t) and st = zst. Then, the selection bias corrected outcome equation is 
+ UYst = 1W1sYst + 2W2sYst +X1;st1 + 1mx2;st2 + s(t)1m st; 
where U = - s(t)1m. By construction, E(U jdst = = 0.st Ust st 1; t)
B.2 Estimation of the peer e¤ect 
To estimate the peer e¤ect coe¢ cients (1; 2), we rst eliminate the selectivity bias using a within 
1transformation. Premultiplying (24) by Q = - 10 , we have Im 1m mm 
QYst = 1QW1sYst + 2QW2sYst +QX1;st1 +QVst: (25) 
To estimate (25), we generalize the CML approach in Lee, Liu and Lin (2010). The transformed 
disturbances QVst in (25) are linearly dependent because its variance matrix 2Q is singular. Fol-
lowing Lee, Liu and Lin (2010), we consider an equivalent but more e¤ective transformation. Let 
p
the orthonormal matrix of Q be [P; 1m = m]. The columns in P are eigenvectors of Q corresponding 
to the eigenvalue one, such that P 01m = 0, P 0P = Im-1 and PP 0 = Q. Therefore, premultiplying 
(24) by P 0 gives 
P 0Yst = 1P
0W1sYst + 2P
0W2sYst + P
0X1;st1 + P
0Vst: (26) 
Let Yst = P 0Yst, X1;st = P 0X1;st, Vst = P 0Vst, W 1s = P 0W1sP , and W 2s = P 0W2sP . As 
25 
- 
P 0W1s =W 1sP
0 and P 0W2s =W 2sP 0, (26) can be rewritten as 
     +  Yst = 1W1sYst + 2W2sYst X1;st1 + Vst; (27) 
where Vst  N(0; v2 Im-1). Hence, (1; 2; 0 1; v2 ) can be estimated by maximizing the conditional 
likelihood function is given by 
T qt
t=1 s=1 
1 
PP - 1m  ln(22) + ln jIm-1 - 1v W1s - 2W2sjdst[-lnL = 2 
(      -      - Yst - 1W1sYst - 2W2sYst X1;st1)0(Yst - 1W1sYst - 2W2sYst X1;st1)]: 22 v 
B.3 Estimation of the selectivity bias 
1Let rst = 10 Then, m(Yst - 1W1sYst - 2W2sYst -X1;st1). m 
rst = x2;st2 + s(t) + st; (28) 
1 10where st = -s(t)+st+ Vst. Then, 2 and unknown parameters in s(t) can be estimated mm 
01 10 ^ ^from (28) with rst replaced by r̂st = m(Yst - ̂1W1sYst - ̂2W2sYst -X1;st 1), where (̂1; ̂2; 1)m 
are the CML estimates. In this appendix, we give the asymptotic covariance of the OLS estimator for 
the parametric selection-bias correction approach. The asymptotic covariance of the semiparametric 
estimator can be derived in a similar way with appropriate modications (see Dahl, 2002, footnote 
24). 
Under the joint normality assumption 
323232 64 st 75  N(64 0 75 ; 64 2  12 75); 
Jst(st) 0 12 1 
we have s(t) = E(stjdst = 1; t) = E(stjJst(st) < Jst(0)) = -12 '(Jst(0)) = -12 '(-1(Pst)), 
where '() = ()=(). Hence, (28) can be written as 
rst = x2;st2 - 12 '(-1(Pst)) + st: 
P^ ^'(-1(Pst)) and '̂st = '(-1(Pst)), where PstLet ' qt r=1 exp(zrt ̂) and ̂ is the = exp(zst̂)==st 
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conditional logit estimator. The (infeasible) OLS estimator of  = (2
0 ; 12)
0 is given by 
T T qt T T qtP P P P P P ~ = ( ĥ0 tĥt)-1 ĥ0 t dstrst =  + ( ĥ0 tĥt)-1 ĥ0 t dst[st + 12('̂ st - ' st)]; 
t=1 t=1 s=1 t=1 t=1 s=1 
qtwhere ĥt = 
P
s=1 dst(x2;st;-'̂st). Let Ast = -1(Pst)' st + 'st 2 and 
qt qtP @'(-1(Pst)) P 1 - P 2rt = dst = - dstAst (Pst st)zst: 
s=1 @0 s=1 (-1(Pst))
P pqtLet A = diagf dstAstgt=1; ;T , H = (h10 ;    ; h0 )0, and r = (r0 1;    ;r0 )0 . We have T (~ -s=1 T T
d 1)! N(0;plim( 1 H 0H)-1 ( H 0H)-1), where T T
1 
H 0(2 = IT - 2 12rr0)H; T 12A+ 
2 
PT Pqt P Pqtqt 29 with  = [ Pst(zst- Prtzrt)0(zst- Prtzrt)]-1 . Furthermore, under certain t=1 s=1 s=1 s=1 
regularity conditions, we can show that the feasible OLS estimator 
T T qtP P P
̂ = ( ĥt 
0 ĥt)
-1 ĥt 
0 dstr̂st 
t=1 t=1 s=1 
~is asymptotically equivalent to . 
C Data Description 
[insert Table C.1 here] 
PT P 2 2 2 1 qt 2 ^ '229 As Var(stjdst = 1) = -2 Ast, 2 can be estimated by ^ = dstf̂ -^ [-1(Pst)^ +^ ]g, 12   T t=1 s=1 st 12 ' st st
where ^ is the OLS estimation residual. st 
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Table C.1: Description of Data 
Label Variable Definition Mean SD Min Max
y Efficiency Current period efficiency score that is given by
(points+rebounds+assists+steals+blocks-misses-turnovers)/minutes.
0.37 1.07 -3.75 8.28
x1 Experience
Fatigue
Minutes played from the start of the game till the end of period t-1.
Minutes continuously played at the end of period t-1.
9.91
3.78
7.81
5.09
0
0
37.58
37.58
x2 RPI
Home
2nd Half
The previous year RPI of the opposing team.
A dummy variable taking value one if it is a home game.
A dummy variable taking value one if it is the second half.
0.55
0.67
0.41
0.08
0.47
0.49
0.38
0
0
0.66
1
1
z Lineup efficiency
Lineup experience
Lineup fatigue
Lineup fouls
One-substitution
Two-substitution
The total efficiency score of the players in the lineup from the start of
the game till the end of period t-1.
The total minutes played by the players in the lineup from the start of
the game till the end of period t-1.
The total minutes continuously played by the players in the lineup at
the end of period t-1.
The total number of fouls of the players in the lineup at the end of
period t-1.
A dummy variable taking value one if it takes one substitution from
the lineup in period t-1 to reach this lineup.
A dummy variable taking value one if it takes two substitutions from
the lineup in period t-1 to reach this lineup.
1.63
49.57
18.92
3.13
0.68
0.22
1.22
34.03
14.06
2.77
0.46
0.42
-2.65
0
0
0
0
0
5.04
152.78
91.70
15
1
1
Number of observations: 2240; number of periods: 448
      
    
      
     
        
       
      
      
          
        
       
        
       
        
       
       
        
       
    
       
          
   
  
  
 
  
  
Table 1: ML Estimation of the Outcome Equation without Selectivity Bias Correction
Dep. Var.: Player Efficiency Model 1 Model 2 Model 3
Peer effects 0.0841***
(0.0279)
Same-type peer effects 0.0638*** 0.0651***
(0.0175) (0.0175)
Cross-type peer effects 0.0345
(0.0216)
Experience 0.0154***
(0.0053)
0.0154***
(0.0053)
0.0156***
(0.0053)
Fatigue -0.0083
(0.0059)
-0.0084
(0.0058)
-0.0083
(0.0058)
RPI -1.1677***
(0.3043)
-1.1538***
(0.3035)
-1.1914***
(0.3028)
Home -0.0030
(0.0490)
-0.0034
(0.0489)
-0.0031
(0.0489)
2nd Half -0.2159***
(0.0683)
-0.2142***
(0.0681)
-0.2197***
(0.0680)
Player dummies Yes Yes Yes
Log likelihood
Sample size
-3294.83
2240
-3291.17
2240
-3292.47
2240
Model 1: the outcome equation with homogenous peer effects
Model 2: the outcome equation with both same-type and cross-type peer effects
Model 3: the outcome equation with only cross-type peer effects
Standard errors in parentheses.
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01 ; **p<0.05 ; *p<0.1.
    
   
       
      
     
     
       
      
     
      
   
       
       
 
  
 
  
 
  
Table 2: Fixed Effect ML Estimation of the Outcome Equation
Dep. Var.: Player Efficiency Model 2 Model 3
Same-type peer effects
Cross-type peer effects
0.1432
(0.1000)
0.1532
(0.1655)
0.0534***
(0.0220)
Experience
Fatigue
0.0337***
(0.0098)
-0.0198***
(0.0075)
0.0316***
(0.0091)
-0.0186***
(0.0070)
Player dummies Yes Yes
Log likelihood
Sample size
-2590.55
2240
-2591.03
2240
Model 2: the outcome equation with both same-type and cross-type peer effects
Model 3: the outcome equation with only cross-type peer effects
Standard errors in parentheses.
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01 ; **p<0.05 ; *p<0.1.
   
  
    
    
   
    
   
   
   
   
    
    
    
    
  
   
    
  
  
 
  
Table 3: Conditional Logit Estimation of the Selection Equation
Dep. Var.: Probability of Lineup Selection
Lineup efficiency 0.1565*
(0.0829)
Lineup experience -0.0268***
(0.0071)
Lineup fatigue -0.0766***
(0.0129)
Lineup fouls -0.1199***
(0.0512)
One-substitution 4.4993***
(0.2712)
Two-substitution 2.2187***
(0.2439)
Player dummies Yes
Log likelihood 
Sample size
-755.94
448
Standard errors in parentheses.
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01 ; **p<0.05 ; *p<0.1.
    
     
         
         
          
             
         
          
          
       
        
          
       
            
  
   
 
  
 
 
Table 4: OLS Estimation of Individual-Invariant Regressors in the Outcome Equation
Dep. Var.: Lineup-Averaged Model 2 Model 3
Estimation Residuals from Table 2 Parametric Series Parametric Series
RPI
Home
2nd Half
-1.0734***
(0.2339)
0.0080
(0.0388)
-0.3526***
(0.0360)
-1.0157***
(0.2331)
0.0151
(0.0386)
-0.3557***
(0.0362)
-1.3081***
(0.3100)
0.0067
(0.0515)
-0.3570***
(0.0477)
-1.2369***
(0.3094)
0.0157
(0.0512)
-0.3597***
(0.0480)
σ12
Wald test for selectivity bias
-0.0325
(0.0324)
11.1764**
[0.0247]
-0.0234
(0.0429)
9.1486*
[0.0575]
Sample size 448 448 448 448
Model 2: the outcome equation with both same-type and cross-type peer effects
Model 3: the outcome equation with only cross-type peer effects
Standard errors in parentheses; p values in brackets
Statistical significance: ***p<0.01 ; **p<0.05 ; *p<0.1.
